Insider Threats: An Educational Handbook of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Case Studies

TY - CHAP

T1 - Insider Threats

T2 - An Educational Handbook of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Case Studies

AU - Hobbs, Christopher

AU - Moran, Matthew

PY - 2015/8

Y1 - 2015/8

N2 - Individuals with malicious intent (‘insiders’) working within nuclear facilities pose arguably the greatest threat to nuclear materials, systems and information. Insiders can exploit their authorised access to bypass multiple layers of security that external adversaries would have to defeat in order to get close to their target. They can also utilise their authority over people and systems, and knowledge of the facility and security systems to both facilitate and mask their actions. When it comes to the theft of the most sensitive types of nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) all known incidences, as reported in the open source, have involved insiders. Exploring the nature of the insider threat and their interaction with different security systems through a series of detailed real-life case studies can inform nuclear security planning. Here the effectiveness of different preventative and protective measures can be evaluated, as can the impact of other influencing factors such as security culture. Case studies can also help bring to life the sometimes heavily technical topic of nuclear security, while at the same time highlighting the seriousness of the threat posed to nuclear security facilities.

AB - Individuals with malicious intent (‘insiders’) working within nuclear facilities pose arguably the greatest threat to nuclear materials, systems and information. Insiders can exploit their authorised access to bypass multiple layers of security that external adversaries would have to defeat in order to get close to their target. They can also utilise their authority over people and systems, and knowledge of the facility and security systems to both facilitate and mask their actions. When it comes to the theft of the most sensitive types of nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) all known incidences, as reported in the open source, have involved insiders. Exploring the nature of the insider threat and their interaction with different security systems through a series of detailed real-life case studies can inform nuclear security planning. Here the effectiveness of different preventative and protective measures can be evaluated, as can the impact of other influencing factors such as security culture. Case studies can also help bring to life the sometimes heavily technical topic of nuclear security, while at the same time highlighting the seriousness of the threat posed to nuclear security facilities.

M3 - Chapter

SP - 1

EP - 40

BT - King's College London

ER -