Justification as ignorance and epistemic Geach principles

Julien Dutant*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance shows how a strongly internalist conception of justification can be derived from a strongly externalist conception of knowledge, given an identification of justification with second-order ignorance (not knowing that one doesn’t know) and a set of structural principles concerning knowing and being in a position to know. Among these principles is an epistemic analogue of the Geach modal schema which states that one is always in a position to know that one doesn’t know p or in a position to know that one doesn’t know not-p. Even suitably refined, the principle faces a range of counterexamples in which it misleadingly and persistently seems to one that one knows whether p without it seeming to one that one knows p nor that one knows not-p. These cases also threaten the book’s case for the luminosity of second-order ignorance, which is in turn central to its derivation of strongly internalist principles of justification.

Original languageEnglish
Article number14
JournalAsian Journal of Philosophy
Volume1
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2022

Keywords

  • Epistemic Geach principles
  • Epistemic logic
  • Ignorance
  • Justification
  • Knowledge

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