Justification as ignorance and epistemic Geach principles

Julien Dutant

doi:10.1007/s44204-022-00011-9

Justification as ignorance and epistemic Geach principles

Julien Dutant^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

King's College London

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance shows how a strongly internalist conception of justification can be derived from a strongly externalist conception of knowledge, given an identification of justification with second-order ignorance (not knowing that one doesn’t know) and a set of structural principles concerning knowing and being in a position to know. Among these principles is an epistemic analogue of the Geach modal schema which states that one is always in a position to know that one doesn’t know p or in a position to know that one doesn’t know not-p. Even suitably refined, the principle faces a range of counterexamples in which it misleadingly and persistently seems to one that one knows whether p without it seeming to one that one knows p nor that one knows not-p. These cases also threaten the book’s case for the luminosity of second-order ignorance, which is in turn central to its derivation of strongly internalist principles of justification.

Original language	English
Article number	14
Journal	Asian Journal of Philosophy
Volume	1
Issue number	1
Early online date	25 Mar 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00011-9
Publication status	Published - Jul 2022

Keywords

Epistemic Geach principles
Epistemic logic
Ignorance
Justification
Knowledge

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10.1007/s44204-022-00011-9Licence: CC BY

Cite this

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KW - Knowledge

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Justification as ignorance and epistemic Geach principles

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