Kant on the Acquisition of Geometrical Concepts

John J. Callanan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
445 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

It is often maintained that one insight of Kant's Critical philosophy is its recognition of the need to distinguish accounts of knowledge acquisition from knowledge justification. In particular, it is claimed that Kant held that the detailing of a concept's acquisition conditions is insufficient to determine its legitimacy. I argue that this is not the case at least with regard to geometrical concepts. Considered in the light of his pre-Critical writings on the mathematical method, construction in the Critique can be seen to be a form of concept acquisition, one that is related to the modal phenomenology of geometrical judgement.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)580-604
Number of pages25
JournalCANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume44
Issue number5-6
Early online date4 Dec 2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2014

Keywords

  • Concepts
  • Construction
  • Geometry
  • Kant
  • Phenomenology

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