Abstract
It is often maintained that one insight of Kant's Critical philosophy is its recognition of the need to distinguish accounts of knowledge acquisition from knowledge justification. In particular, it is claimed that Kant held that the detailing of a concept's acquisition conditions is insufficient to determine its legitimacy. I argue that this is not the case at least with regard to geometrical concepts. Considered in the light of his pre-Critical writings on the mathematical method, construction in the Critique can be seen to be a form of concept acquisition, one that is related to the modal phenomenology of geometrical judgement.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 580-604 |
Number of pages | 25 |
Journal | CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY |
Volume | 44 |
Issue number | 5-6 |
Early online date | 4 Dec 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Dec 2014 |
Keywords
- Concepts
- Construction
- Geometry
- Kant
- Phenomenology