Kant on the spontaneous power of the mind

John J. Callanan

doi:10.1080/09608788.2016.1263183

Kant on the spontaneous power of the mind

John J. Callanan^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

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Abstract

It is well known that at the heart of Kant’s Critical philosophy is the claim that the mind possesses an essentially spontaneous power or capacity (Vermögen). It is also sometimes maintained that Kant’s appeals to this spontaneous power are intimately tied to his recognition of there being a fundamental and irreducible normative dimension to judgement. However, I attempt to complicate this picture by way of appeal to some less appreciated influences upon the development of Kant’s epistemology. A different conception of the role of spontaneity in judgement has clear precedents, I claim, in the works of Cudworth and Rousseau. There the imagined role for the active power of the mind is not to identify criteria that might serve as norms for epistemically responsible judgement. Rather the spontaneous power of the mind is cited as the source of representational contents that secure the truth conditions of our everyday claims to empirical knowledge.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	565-588
Journal	British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume	25
Issue number	3
Early online date	15 Feb 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2016.1263183
Publication status	Published - 2017

Keywords

Cudworth
Kant
power
Rousseau
spontaneity

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10.1080/09608788.2016.1263183

Kant on the Spontaneous_CALLANAN_Accepted17November2016Publishedonline15February2017_GREEN AAMAccepted author manuscript, 434 KB

Cite this

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Kant on the spontaneous power of the mind

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Keywords

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