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Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies

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Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies. / Koop, Christel; Kessler, Philip.

In: Governance, 15.06.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Koop, C & Kessler, P 2020, 'Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies', Governance.

APA

Koop, C., & Kessler, P. (Accepted/In press). Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies. Governance.

Vancouver

Koop C, Kessler P. Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies. Governance. 2020 Jun 15.

Author

Koop, Christel ; Kessler, Philip. / Keeping control of regulation? Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies. In: Governance. 2020.

Bibtex Download

@article{98702e844599427b99dba35e6b034c9a,
title = "Keeping control of regulation?: Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies",
abstract = "Regulatory independence has become an international norm over the past decades. Yet, governments in some emerging and developing economies have eschewed the model. We argue that this outcome is shaped by the domestic institutional context; in particular, authoritarianism and traditions of state control over the economy. Analysing new data on the adoption and operation of independent competition authorities between 1990 and 2017, we find that authoritarianism and, to some extent, state-led economic traditions negatively affect formal adoption. By contrast, these institutional constraints do not have much impact on the start of the operations, which seems to be driven primarily by capacity and economic need. Our findings shed light on domestic institutional constraints on the spread of international norms and the limits of ‘regulatory transplants’ in the Global South.",
keywords = "regulatory agencies, independence, competition policy, regulatory state, emerging and developing economies",
author = "Christel Koop and Philip Kessler",
year = "2020",
month = "6",
day = "15",
language = "English",
journal = "Governance",
issn = "1468-0491",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Keeping control of regulation?

T2 - Domestic constraints on the creation of independent authorities in emerging and developing economies

AU - Koop, Christel

AU - Kessler, Philip

PY - 2020/6/15

Y1 - 2020/6/15

N2 - Regulatory independence has become an international norm over the past decades. Yet, governments in some emerging and developing economies have eschewed the model. We argue that this outcome is shaped by the domestic institutional context; in particular, authoritarianism and traditions of state control over the economy. Analysing new data on the adoption and operation of independent competition authorities between 1990 and 2017, we find that authoritarianism and, to some extent, state-led economic traditions negatively affect formal adoption. By contrast, these institutional constraints do not have much impact on the start of the operations, which seems to be driven primarily by capacity and economic need. Our findings shed light on domestic institutional constraints on the spread of international norms and the limits of ‘regulatory transplants’ in the Global South.

AB - Regulatory independence has become an international norm over the past decades. Yet, governments in some emerging and developing economies have eschewed the model. We argue that this outcome is shaped by the domestic institutional context; in particular, authoritarianism and traditions of state control over the economy. Analysing new data on the adoption and operation of independent competition authorities between 1990 and 2017, we find that authoritarianism and, to some extent, state-led economic traditions negatively affect formal adoption. By contrast, these institutional constraints do not have much impact on the start of the operations, which seems to be driven primarily by capacity and economic need. Our findings shed light on domestic institutional constraints on the spread of international norms and the limits of ‘regulatory transplants’ in the Global South.

KW - regulatory agencies

KW - independence

KW - competition policy

KW - regulatory state

KW - emerging and developing economies

M3 - Article

JO - Governance

JF - Governance

SN - 1468-0491

ER -

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