Abstract
Accounts of theoretical levels range from very weak to very strong. Very weak accounts do not offer articulated level structure or underpin ontological claims. Very strong accounts are at odds with our understanding of reduction in physics. This chapter proposes a mid-strength account of theoretical levels based on accounts of novelty and autonomy in physics. Accounts in the philosophy of physics literature often hold novelty and autonomy to be the hallmarks of weak emergence but focus on autonomy at the expense of novelty. The chapter suggests that an account of novelty based on the importance of variable changes in inter-theoretic relations might underpin an appropriate conception of levels. The result is a local, system-specific, and sparse (but not unrealistically sparse) levels structure that can underpin modest ontological commitments.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Levels of Explanation |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 237-251 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191953941 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780192862945 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2025 |
Keywords
- autonomy
- emergence
- emergence in physics
- explanation in physics
- levels of explanation
- novelty
- reduction in physics
- theory reduction