TY - JOUR
T1 - Little Emperor CEOs
T2 - Firm Risk and Performance When CEOs Grow Up without Siblings
AU - Wang, Tianxi
AU - Gonzalez, Angelica
AU - Hagendorff, Jens
AU - Sila, Vathunyoo
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Authors
PY - 2025/2
Y1 - 2025/2
N2 - Using hand-collected data on the CEOs of Chinese companies, we find that managers who grow up without siblings are associated with riskier firms and worse performance. Our analysis exploits regional and time variation in China’s compulsory one-child policy as a shock to fertility rates. Consistent with explanations that only-children have not experienced competition among siblings, we show that firms led by only-child CEOs underperform when industry competition is stronger. Our findings suggest that fertility policies affect the supply of managerial capital and, consequently, corporate policies and performance.
AB - Using hand-collected data on the CEOs of Chinese companies, we find that managers who grow up without siblings are associated with riskier firms and worse performance. Our analysis exploits regional and time variation in China’s compulsory one-child policy as a shock to fertility rates. Consistent with explanations that only-children have not experienced competition among siblings, we show that firms led by only-child CEOs underperform when industry competition is stronger. Our findings suggest that fertility policies affect the supply of managerial capital and, consequently, corporate policies and performance.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85209062026&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102658
DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102658
M3 - Article
SN - 0929-1199
VL - 90
JO - Journal of Corporate Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Finance
M1 - 102658
ER -