Abstract
An increasingly popular view at the intersection of logic and metaphysics is that logical necessities have their source in the essences of logical entities. On such a view, metaphysical necessity has its source in the essences or natures of things, and logical necessity is a restriction of metaphysical necessity. But logical and metaphysical necessity are, nevertheless, importantly distinct: there are metaphysical necessities that are not logical necessities. In this paper I raise a serious problem for this essentialist view: it seems as though they must misclassify some merely metaphysical necessities as logical necessities. I argue that the essentialist can accommodate these cases only at the cost of sacrificing core features of the view: either that it is recognisably an account of logical necessity; or that it is given in terms of logical entities. I close by offering a brief diagnosis of the root of the problem.
| Original language | English |
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| Journal | Argumenta |
| Issue number | 14 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 4 Oct 2021 |