Abstract
Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union’s response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its oversight powers over executive bodies in the implementation of crisis legislation. This article systematically assesses the conditions under which the EP has been successful in increasing its account-holding powers, using new data on the accountability provisions included in economic and financial legislation put forward between 2009 and 2014. It is found that Parliament has indeed been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation. Levels of accountability are also higher in package deals and more salient legislation. The findings here provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament’s inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and give more insight into the EP’s account-holding role.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 776-802 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 15 Feb 2019 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 7 Jun 2019 |
Keywords
- Accountability
- economic governance
- European debt crisis
- European Parliament
- inter-institutional bargaining
