Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness

AU - Textor, Mark

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

PY - 2022/7/16

Y1 - 2022/7/16

N2 - Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously holds objects together as well as apart such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an 'indivisible unity.' I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze's Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze's argument to the contemporary debate between top-down and bottom-up views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)

AB - Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously holds objects together as well as apart such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an 'indivisible unity.' I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze's Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze's argument to the contemporary debate between top-down and bottom-up views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)

KW - comparison

KW - composition

KW - Franz Brentano

KW - Hermann Lotze

KW - Immanuel Kant

KW - Johann Friedrich Herbart

KW - unity of consciousness

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85150034686&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/can.2022.48

DO - 10.1017/can.2022.48

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85150034686

SN - 0045-5091

VL - 52

SP - 556

EP - 572

JO - CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

JF - CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

IS - 5

ER -