Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness

TY - JOUR

T1 - Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness

AU - Textor, Mark

PY - 2022/12/10

Y1 - 2022/12/10

N2 - Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously ‘holds objects together as well as apart’ such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity’. I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I content that it does not deliver (a), but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here).

AB - Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously ‘holds objects together as well as apart’ such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity’. I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I content that it does not deliver (a), but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here).

M3 - Article

SN - 0045-5091

JO - CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

JF - CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

ER -