Making Sense of Knowing‐How and Knowing‐That

TY - JOUR

T1 - Making Sense of Knowing‐How and Knowing‐That

AU - Lum, Gerard

PY - 2017/8/29

Y1 - 2017/8/29

N2 - Noting the resurgence of interest in Ryle’s knowing how / knowing that distinction the paper examines the viability of this distinction along with claims to reduce one form of knowing to the other. It is suggested that by separating questions about the nature of knowledge from questions about third person attributions of knowledge, it is possible to determine the circumstances in which use of the distinction is and is not viable. By drawing attention to one important feature of Ryle’s argument and suggesting a corrective to another it is argued that by Ryle’s own account the distinction cannot properly be regarded as an epistemological distinction. The paper concludes by considering some negative educational implications of the assumption that it is possible to distinguish two kinds of knowledge.

AB - Noting the resurgence of interest in Ryle’s knowing how / knowing that distinction the paper examines the viability of this distinction along with claims to reduce one form of knowing to the other. It is suggested that by separating questions about the nature of knowledge from questions about third person attributions of knowledge, it is possible to determine the circumstances in which use of the distinction is and is not viable. By drawing attention to one important feature of Ryle’s argument and suggesting a corrective to another it is argued that by Ryle’s own account the distinction cannot properly be regarded as an epistemological distinction. The paper concludes by considering some negative educational implications of the assumption that it is possible to distinguish two kinds of knowledge.

U2 - 10.1111/1467-9752.12256

DO - 10.1111/1467-9752.12256

M3 - Article

SN - 0309-8249

VL - 51

SP - 655

EP - 672

JO - JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

JF - JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

IS - 3

ER -