Abstract
This dissertation focuses on how Russian TV viewers make sense of the news in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It is based on focus groups with TV viewers and borrows the conceptual apparatus of political communication, psychology, and political science to analyze three separate domains of news processing under an electoral authoritarian regime: the formation of political opinions based on television news, the use of heuristics to evaluate the credibility of TV news, and the use of a range of information sources, both offline and online, in a high-choice media environment. Based on the existing literature, this study relies on the premise that citizens under authoritarian regimes lack incentives, cognitive tools, and opportunities to substantively process news and investigates how these three features are reflected in the political psychology and news processing of TV viewers. First, this study contributes to the literature on news processing under electoral authoritarian regimes. While scholars have identified numerous factors which affect how citizens (dis)trust news in authoritarian contexts, the role of political engagement in news processing is rarely taken into account in the analysis of electoral authoritarian regimes. My findings suggest that crucially affects how citizens make sense of the news. I find that a minority of focus group participants are politically engaged and rely on consistent political schemas to make sense of the news and demonstrate signs of consistency bias. Most participants are politically disengaged. They rely on the ideas which are more accessible in memory, contain both criticism and approval of state policies, and support the authoritarian equilibrium by being unable to articulate consistent opinions. Second, this study contributes to a better understanding of the functioning of low- information rationality under an electoral authoritarian regime. Scholars assume that in dealing with the news and political information, TV viewers rely on a wide variety of heuristics which are drawn from both daily life and the political environment. However, the literature on how citizens use heuristics outside democratic contexts is limited. I find that in dealing with the news, TV viewers prefer to rely on common sense and cultural stereotypes because political and media institutions under an electoral authoritarian regime are not seen as independent and authoritative. Finally, the study contributes to a better understanding of how the development of high-choice media environments affects news processing outside of democratic contexts. I find that politically engaged participants often find information which fits their pre-existing preferences demonstrating signs of selective exposure. Participants who are less politically engaged participants rely on TV news in combination with news aggregators to simplify information search. Since Russian news aggregators include information which is not different from TV news, this synchronization verifies the credibility of TV news. While the original concept of the personalized filter bubble is based on the complex interaction between individuals’ preferences and algorithms, I identify the orchestrated filter bubble effect which is based on the agenda of state-controlled television. Imposed in top-down fashion by the state, this filter bubble effect is used to reinforce the messages of the state-controlled television rather than citizens’ individual preferences under an electoral authoritarian regime.
Original language | English |
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Type | Doctoral Dissertation |
Publisher | University of Helsinki |
Number of pages | 231 |
Place of Publication | Helsinki |
ISBN (Print) | 978-951-51-7231-0 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-951-51-7232-7 |
Publication status | Published - 17 May 2021 |
Keywords
- political communication
- news reception
- authoritarian regimes
- Russia
- Ukraine