Martin Heidegger: From Fluid Action to Gelassenheit

TY - CHAP

T1 - Martin Heidegger

T2 - From Fluid Action to Gelassenheit

AU - Golob, Sacha

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Heidegger’s views on agency are central to his philosophy: in both his earlier and later work they form part of an intricate web of notions including responsibility, normativity and activity. At the same time, however, Heidegger’s position can be elusive. This is partly due to deep methodological and conceptual differences which make it hard to locate him in relation to the standard Analytic or Kantian debates. It is also because his views are subject to a series of complex shifts – for example, during the early 1930s and then again in the aftermath of the war. There is no scholarly consensus on the exact nature of these shifts or on the degree of continuity or change that they imply: as a result, it is impossible to adequately address Heidegger’s views on ‘agency’ or indeed any other topic in a single article without radically restricting the chronological range of the discussion. For both these reasons, I am going to focus on the period around Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, published 1927): Heidegger’s most influential text, it is also the best point of contact with contemporary philosophy of action or with other phenomenologists. I want particularly to emphasise the distinctive role which phenomenology plays in separating Heidegger’s picture of agency from the alternatives. Throughout I will try to avoid an excessive reliance on Heidegger’s distinctive terminology: my aim in that sense is to provide an analysis of his views, rather than a recitation of them.

AB - Heidegger’s views on agency are central to his philosophy: in both his earlier and later work they form part of an intricate web of notions including responsibility, normativity and activity. At the same time, however, Heidegger’s position can be elusive. This is partly due to deep methodological and conceptual differences which make it hard to locate him in relation to the standard Analytic or Kantian debates. It is also because his views are subject to a series of complex shifts – for example, during the early 1930s and then again in the aftermath of the war. There is no scholarly consensus on the exact nature of these shifts or on the degree of continuity or change that they imply: as a result, it is impossible to adequately address Heidegger’s views on ‘agency’ or indeed any other topic in a single article without radically restricting the chronological range of the discussion. For both these reasons, I am going to focus on the period around Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, published 1927): Heidegger’s most influential text, it is also the best point of contact with contemporary philosophy of action or with other phenomenologists. I want particularly to emphasise the distinctive role which phenomenology plays in separating Heidegger’s picture of agency from the alternatives. Throughout I will try to avoid an excessive reliance on Heidegger’s distinctive terminology: my aim in that sense is to provide an analysis of his views, rather than a recitation of them.

KW - Phenomenology

KW - Heidegger

KW - Agency

KW - Martin Heidegger

M3 - Chapter

SN - 9781138098978

BT - The Routledge Handbook of the Phenomenology of Agency

A2 - Erhard, Christopher

A2 - Keiling, Tobias

PB - Routledge

ER -