Meaning Underdetermines What Is Said, Therefore Utterances Express Many Propositions

Thomas Hodgson

doi:10.1111/dltc.v72.2

Meaning Underdetermines What Is Said, Therefore Utterances Express Many Propositions

Thomas Hodgson

Philosophy

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1 Citation (Scopus)

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Abstract

Linguistic meaning underdetermines what is said. This has consequences for philosophical accounts of meaning, communication, and propositional attitude reports. I argue that the consequence we should endorse is that utterances typically express many propositions, that these are what speakers mean, and that the correct semantics for attitude reports will handle this fact while being relational and propositional.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	165-189
Journal	DIALECTICA
Volume	72
Issue number	2
Early online date	24 Aug 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/dltc.v72.2
Publication status	Published - 2018

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10.1111/dltc.v72.2

Meaning Underdetermines What Is_HODGSON_Publishedonline24August2018_GREEN AAMAccepted author manuscript, 401 KB

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Meaning Underdetermines What Is Said, Therefore Utterances Express Many Propositions

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