Militias in Internal Warfare: From the Colonial Era to the Contemporary Middle East

TY - JOUR

T1 - Militias in Internal Warfare

T2 - From the Colonial Era to the Contemporary Middle East

AU - Hughes, Geraint Alun

PY - 2016/3/21

Y1 - 2016/3/21

N2 - Although it is a tenet of political science that the modern state possesses a ‘monopoly of violence’, governments have repeatedly used militias outside the formal chain of command of their armed forces when waging counter-insurgency (COIN), and in recent conflicts the USA, UK and other Western powers have used irregular forces when fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. War-weariness and financial austerity is likely to encourage American and allied policy-makers to rely on auxiliaries as proxies, despite the fact that historical experience demonstrates that the use of militias in COIN can have counter-productive consequences, not least for state stability. This article also concludes that the tendency of some Middle Eastern states (notably Iraq and Syria) to ‘coup-proof’ their militaries renders them even more dependent on militias in the face of a sustained internal revolt, as their regular armed forces collapse under the stress of combat. In this respect, there is a direct link between ‘coup-proofing’, dependence on irregular auxiliaries in civil war, and the erosion of the state’s integrity.

AB - Although it is a tenet of political science that the modern state possesses a ‘monopoly of violence’, governments have repeatedly used militias outside the formal chain of command of their armed forces when waging counter-insurgency (COIN), and in recent conflicts the USA, UK and other Western powers have used irregular forces when fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. War-weariness and financial austerity is likely to encourage American and allied policy-makers to rely on auxiliaries as proxies, despite the fact that historical experience demonstrates that the use of militias in COIN can have counter-productive consequences, not least for state stability. This article also concludes that the tendency of some Middle Eastern states (notably Iraq and Syria) to ‘coup-proof’ their militaries renders them even more dependent on militias in the face of a sustained internal revolt, as their regular armed forces collapse under the stress of combat. In this respect, there is a direct link between ‘coup-proofing’, dependence on irregular auxiliaries in civil war, and the erosion of the state’s integrity.

U2 - 10.1080/09592318.2015.1129171

DO - 10.1080/09592318.2015.1129171

M3 - Article

SN - 0959-2318

VL - 27

SP - 196

EP - 225

JO - Small Wars and Insurgencies

JF - Small Wars and Insurgencies

IS - 2

ER -