Mind, meaning & mental disorder: The nature of causal explanation in psychology & psychiatry

TY - JOUR

T1 - Mind, meaning & mental disorder: The nature of causal explanation in psychology & psychiatry

AU - Bolton, D

AU - Hill, J

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - The book proposes a new analysis of mental causation and applies it to the problem of mental disorder and its etiology. The proposed analysis grounds mental causation in information-processing, which characterizes not only mental but also biological functions. It involves driving Brentano's thesis downwards, with the argument that biological processes have (genuine) intentionality and that there is a seamless transition through developmental biology and psychology to mature human cognition. This is primarily a philosophical and conceptual case, drawing on examples from biological and psychological research. It aims to provide a justification for, and explicit statement of the implications of, assumptions that are already commonplace in the behavioural and neurosciences. In contrast with current philosophical analyses of the role of intentionality in behaviour, the analysis shows how the conditions for intentionality in the normal case contain the conditions for disordered functioning. These proposals are worked out in relation to major areas of psychopathology, including depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, and personality disorders.

AB - The book proposes a new analysis of mental causation and applies it to the problem of mental disorder and its etiology. The proposed analysis grounds mental causation in information-processing, which characterizes not only mental but also biological functions. It involves driving Brentano's thesis downwards, with the argument that biological processes have (genuine) intentionality and that there is a seamless transition through developmental biology and psychology to mature human cognition. This is primarily a philosophical and conceptual case, drawing on examples from biological and psychological research. It aims to provide a justification for, and explicit statement of the implications of, assumptions that are already commonplace in the behavioural and neurosciences. In contrast with current philosophical analyses of the role of intentionality in behaviour, the analysis shows how the conditions for intentionality in the normal case contain the conditions for disordered functioning. These proposals are worked out in relation to major areas of psychopathology, including depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, and personality disorders.

M3 - Article

VL - 12

SP - 1

EP - 10

JO - PSYCOLOQUY

JF - PSYCOLOQUY

IS - 18

ER -