TY - CHAP
T1 - Multiwinner candidacy games
AU - Obraztsova, Svetlana
AU - Polukarov, Maria
AU - Elkind, Edith
AU - Grzesiuk, Marek
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multiwinner elections, where the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of candidates (a committee), rather than a single winner. We examine the existence and properties of Nash equilibria in the resulting class of games, under various voting rules and voter preference structures.
AB - In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of possible election outcomes, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the result in their favor. In this work, we extend the candidacy game model to the setting of multiwinner elections, where the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of candidates (a committee), rather than a single winner. We examine the existence and properties of Nash equilibria in the resulting class of games, under various voting rules and voter preference structures.
KW - Non-cooperative games: theory & analysis
KW - Social choice theory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85096657535&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference paper
AN - SCOPUS:85096657535
T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
SP - 957
EP - 965
BT - Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020
A2 - An, Bo
A2 - El Fallah Seghrouchni, Amal
A2 - Sukthankar, Gita
PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
T2 - 19th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2020
Y2 - 19 May 2020
ER -