Myth and the Small War Tradition:: Reassessing the Discourse of British Counter-Insurgency

David Martin Jones; M.L.R. Smith

doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.802604

Myth and the Small War Tradition: Reassessing the Discourse of British Counter-Insurgency

David Martin Jones, M.L.R. Smith

War Studies

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	436-464
Number of pages	28
Journal	Small Wars and Insurgencies
Volume	24
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.802604
Publication status	Published - 2013

Keywords

COIN
Insurgency
Counter-Insurgency
Small Wars

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Access to Document

10.1080/09592318.2013.802604

Cite this

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