n-1 Guilty Men

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review


We argue that there is nothing that can do the work that normative reasons are expected to do. A currently popular view is that in any given situation, a set of normative reasons (understood as a set of facts, typically about the agent’s situation) always determines the ways we prospectively should or should not respond. We discuss an example that we think shows no such collection of facts could have this normative significance. A radical response might be to dispense with reasons and explain the facts about the ways we should respond using something else entirely (e.g., expected value). We think a more fruitful approach is to explore the possibility of using decision-theoretic tools in a reasons-centred framework.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Future of Normativity
EditorsSimon Kirchin
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 1 Oct 2023


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