Abstract
This paper sets out a view about the explanatory role of representational content and advocates one approach to naturalising content – to giving a naturalistic account of what makes an entity a representation and in virtue of what it has the content it does. It argues for pluralism about the metaphysics of content and suggests that a good strategy is to ask the content question with respect to a variety of predictively successful information processing models in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience; and hence that data from psychology and cognitive neuroscience should play a greater role in theorising about the nature of content. Finally, the contours of the view are illustrated by drawing out and defending a surprising consequence: that individuation of vehicles of content is partly externalist.
Original language | English |
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Article number | N/A |
Pages (from-to) | 496-509 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Philosophy Compass |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 5 |
Early online date | 27 Mar 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2013 |
Keywords
- representational content
- theories of content
- naturalism
- meta-semantics