Abstract
This work collects ten essays on matters first discussed in Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity (2000). There I asked what form of control we must have over something in order to be held to the norms governing that thing and it was argued that belief, intention and action each require a different type of control. The forms of freedom appropriate to each of them and so the presuppositions of responsibility to each of them vary. In the present work I elaborate and defend that idea.
Reason Without Freedom also aimed to show that discussion of issues in the moral psychology of belief would cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony. The present work continues that project and responds to some pertinent developments in recent epistemology.
Reason Without Freedom also aimed to show that discussion of issues in the moral psychology of belief would cast light on some of the traditional problems of epistemology and in particular on the problems of scepticism and testimony. The present work continues that project and responds to some pertinent developments in recent epistemology.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford Univerity Press; Oxford |
| Number of pages | 247 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198713234 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2017 |