Northern Ireland and minimum force: the refutation of a concept?

B. W. Morgan*, M. L. R. Smith

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The debate over whether there exists a British counter-insurgency tradition of minimum force is one that has been thoroughly discussed. Is there anything left to say? This study suggests there is further insight to be attained if one explicitly evaluates the concept of minimum force in relation to the conduct of the security forces in the years of the Northern Ireland conflict. Through an examination of three key periods in the conflict, it will be shown that while there was invariably an awareness of the need to act with restraint among senior officers at the strategic level, this was often difficult to apply at the tactical level in the heat of confrontation. The argument demonstrates that the British Army, and other instruments of the state, rarely acted in a manner that could be described as ‘minimal’. Instead, it was the broader liberal values of the British state that explains largely the degrees of restraint exhibited by the government and security forces.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-105
Number of pages25
JournalSmall Wars and Insurgencies
Volume27
Issue number1
Early online date5 Feb 2016
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 5 Feb 2016

Keywords

  • British Army
  • counter-insurgency
  • Minimum force
  • Northern Ireland

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