Nuclear Security Implications of Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items Entering the Nuclear Supply Chain

Christopher Hobbs, Zoha Naser, Daniel Salisbury, Sarah Tzinieris

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paper

115 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The paper presents the preliminary findings of research conducted by King’s academics as part of an IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items (CFSIs). It explores how and why CFSIs have entered supply chains in the nuclear industry and other critical sectors, through examining the role of key actors and real-life incidents. The research discusses emerging trends and their relevance for the nuclear industry and illustrates how networks supplying counterfeit items operate in certain geographic hotspots and exploit legitimate channels of international trade to facilitate their operations. The research also reveals the potentially significant and wide-ranging impact of counterfeit and fraudulent items (CFIs) in critical sectors, which include financial, reputational and physical consequences such as the severe degradation of operational, safety and security systems. At present there is relatively little information available publicly on incidents involving CFIs and one of the major goals of this research is to unearth cases that improve international understanding of both the threat and how systems can be strengthened to prevent, detect and respond to this relatively unexplored aspect of nuclear security and safety.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024)
Publication statusPublished - 28 Feb 2024

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Nuclear Security Implications of Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items Entering the Nuclear Supply Chain'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this