Nuclear terrorism and virtual risk: Implications for prediction and the utility of models

TY - JOUR

T1 - Nuclear terrorism and virtual risk

T2 - Implications for prediction and the utility of models

AU - Hobbs, Christopher

AU - Downes, Robert James

PY - 2017/7

Y1 - 2017/7

N2 - Assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism is a challenging task due to the diversity of actors involved, variety of pathways to success, range of defensive measures employed, and the lack of detailed historical record upon which to base a nalysis. Numerical models developed to date vary wildly in both approach and ultimate assessment: estimates of the likelihood a nuclear terrorist attack differ by up to nine orders of magnitude. This paper critiques existing efforts from the standpoint of probability theory, and proposes an alternative perspective on the utility of risk assessment in this area. Nuclear terrorism is argued to be a ‘virtual risk’ for which it is not possible to meaningfully ascribe a quantitative measure, making numerical estimates of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism misleading. Instead, we argue that focus should be placed on utilising models to identify areas of disagreement as targets for further research, with greater emphasis on understanding terrorist decision-making and adaption in response to nuclear security measures.

AB - Assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism is a challenging task due to the diversity of actors involved, variety of pathways to success, range of defensive measures employed, and the lack of detailed historical record upon which to base a nalysis. Numerical models developed to date vary wildly in both approach and ultimate assessment: estimates of the likelihood a nuclear terrorist attack differ by up to nine orders of magnitude. This paper critiques existing efforts from the standpoint of probability theory, and proposes an alternative perspective on the utility of risk assessment in this area. Nuclear terrorism is argued to be a ‘virtual risk’ for which it is not possible to meaningfully ascribe a quantitative measure, making numerical estimates of the likelihood of nuclear terrorism misleading. Instead, we argue that focus should be placed on utilising models to identify areas of disagreement as targets for further research, with greater emphasis on understanding terrorist decision-making and adaption in response to nuclear security measures.

U2 - 10.1017/eis.2017.5

DO - 10.1017/eis.2017.5

M3 - Article

SN - 2057-5637

VL - 2

SP - 203

EP - 222

JO - European Journal of International Security

JF - European Journal of International Security

IS - 2

ER -