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Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality

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Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality. / Wolff, Johanna Elisabeth.

In: FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS, Vol. 45, No. 9, 09.2015, p. 1046-1062.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Wolff, JE 2015, 'Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality', FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS, vol. 45, no. 9, pp. 1046-1062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-015-9904-7

APA

Wolff, J. E. (2015). Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality. FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS, 45(9), 1046-1062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-015-9904-7

Vancouver

Wolff JE. Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality. FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS. 2015 Sep;45(9):1046-1062. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-015-9904-7

Author

Wolff, Johanna Elisabeth. / Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality. In: FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS. 2015 ; Vol. 45, No. 9. pp. 1046-1062.

Bibtex Download

@article{082bebc6474d490f867c510e42685d91,
title = "Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality",
abstract = "Theories in fundamental physics are unlikely to be ontologically neutral, yet they may nonetheless fail to offer decisive empirical support for or against particular metaphysical positions. I illustrate this point by close examination of a particular objection raised by Wolfgang Pauli against Hermann Weyl. The exchange reveals that both parties to the dispute appeal to broader epistemological principles to defend their preferred metaphysical starting points. I suggest that this should make us hesitant to assume that in deriving metaphysical conclusions from physical theories we place our metaphysical theories on a purely empirical foundation. The metaphysics within a particular physical theory may well be the result of a priori assumptions in the background, not particular empirical findings.",
keywords = "Weyl, Pauli, Interpreting Physics, continuum, field concept",
author = "Wolff, {Johanna Elisabeth}",
year = "2015",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1007/s10701-015-9904-7",
language = "English",
volume = "45",
pages = "1046--1062",
journal = "FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS",
issn = "0015-9018",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "9",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Observability, Visualizability and the Question of Metaphysical Neutrality

AU - Wolff, Johanna Elisabeth

PY - 2015/9

Y1 - 2015/9

N2 - Theories in fundamental physics are unlikely to be ontologically neutral, yet they may nonetheless fail to offer decisive empirical support for or against particular metaphysical positions. I illustrate this point by close examination of a particular objection raised by Wolfgang Pauli against Hermann Weyl. The exchange reveals that both parties to the dispute appeal to broader epistemological principles to defend their preferred metaphysical starting points. I suggest that this should make us hesitant to assume that in deriving metaphysical conclusions from physical theories we place our metaphysical theories on a purely empirical foundation. The metaphysics within a particular physical theory may well be the result of a priori assumptions in the background, not particular empirical findings.

AB - Theories in fundamental physics are unlikely to be ontologically neutral, yet they may nonetheless fail to offer decisive empirical support for or against particular metaphysical positions. I illustrate this point by close examination of a particular objection raised by Wolfgang Pauli against Hermann Weyl. The exchange reveals that both parties to the dispute appeal to broader epistemological principles to defend their preferred metaphysical starting points. I suggest that this should make us hesitant to assume that in deriving metaphysical conclusions from physical theories we place our metaphysical theories on a purely empirical foundation. The metaphysics within a particular physical theory may well be the result of a priori assumptions in the background, not particular empirical findings.

KW - Weyl

KW - Pauli

KW - Interpreting Physics

KW - continuum

KW - field concept

U2 - 10.1007/s10701-015-9904-7

DO - 10.1007/s10701-015-9904-7

M3 - Article

VL - 45

SP - 1046

EP - 1062

JO - FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS

JF - FOUNDATIONS OF PHYSICS

SN - 0015-9018

IS - 9

ER -

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