On Salience-Based Theories of Demonstratives

Eliot Michaelson, Ethan Nowak

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we examine a number of ways in which the notion of salience has been or might be used to fix the reference of demonstrative expressions. Although we find the idea generally attractive, we conclude that the prospects for a theory of demonstrative reference based on salience are not, in fact, very good. We conclude by considering how certain aspects of these salience-based views might be productively integrated into alternative theories of demonstrative reference—and, indeed, theories of meaning more broadly.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSalience
Subtitle of host publicationA Philosophical Inquiry
PublisherRoutledge
Chapter4
ISBN (Print)9780815385196
Publication statusPublished - 17 Mar 2022

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