Abstract
In his classic work on the logic of knowledge and belief, Jaakko Hintikka gave a brief analysis of the type of self-deception that is expressed in the following remark by Michel de Montaigne: “Some make the world believe that they believe what they do not believe; others, in greater number, make themselves believe it.” Hintikka’s account not only gives a logically consistent representation of this species of self-deception, but also explains the apparent incoherence of the self-deceiver’s belief state.
This paper argues that Montaigne’s remark describes just one of a small group of ‘self-deception positions’, the others of which cannot be consistently represented in the logic of belief used by Hintikka. It is shown how each member of the group of ‘self-deception positions’ can be characterized consistently, using a logic of belief weaker than Hintikka’s. An alternative explanation is then offered of the incoherence latent in self-deception, and the account is extended to incorporate an analysis of Moore’s puzzle about ‘saying and disbelieving’.
This paper argues that Montaigne’s remark describes just one of a small group of ‘self-deception positions’, the others of which cannot be consistently represented in the logic of belief used by Hintikka. It is shown how each member of the group of ‘self-deception positions’ can be characterized consistently, using a logic of belief weaker than Hintikka’s. An alternative explanation is then offered of the incoherence latent in self-deception, and the account is extended to incorporate an analysis of Moore’s puzzle about ‘saying and disbelieving’.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 387–400 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | South American Journal of Logic |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2015 |