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Operation TIGRESS: deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test

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Operation TIGRESS : deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test. / Dylan, Huw.

In: Journal of Intelligence History, Vol. 14, No. 1, 01.2015, p. 1-15.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Dylan, H 2015, 'Operation TIGRESS: deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test', Journal of Intelligence History, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2014.943996

APA

Dylan, H. (2015). Operation TIGRESS: deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test. Journal of Intelligence History, 14(1), 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2014.943996

Vancouver

Dylan H. Operation TIGRESS: deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test. Journal of Intelligence History. 2015 Jan;14(1):1-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2014.943996

Author

Dylan, Huw. / Operation TIGRESS : deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test. In: Journal of Intelligence History. 2015 ; Vol. 14, No. 1. pp. 1-15.

Bibtex Download

@article{bbb6a463603f48ecb418171e37de17cc,
title = "Operation TIGRESS: deception for counterintelligence and Britain{\textquoteright}s 1952 atomic test",
abstract = "Britain tested its first atomic weapon on the Montebello islands, off Western Australia, in October 1952. This test, known as HURRICANE, was supported by an elaborate deception operation, one designed to deceive the Soviets about the date and the true nature of the test. This article examines this deception. It introduces Britain{\textquoteright}s post-war deception organisations, the London Controlling Section, later the Directorate of Forward Plans, and how they worked closely with Britain{\textquoteright}s atomic scientists from early in the Cold War. Their plans were complicated both by the Soviets{\textquoteright} success in gathering intelligence on Britain{\textquoteright}s nuclear programme, and by the West{\textquoteright}s difficulty in gathering intelligence on Soviet dispositions. Nevertheless, they utilised a broad range of channels, both open and secret, to implement their scheme. The manner in which they operated suggests that the deception and intelligence machinery had clearly adapted their methods to the Cold War environment, but that the task was considerably more difficult than the one they faced in wartime.",
keywords = "London Controlling Section, HURRICANE, Deception, Directorate of Forward Plans",
author = "Huw Dylan",
year = "2015",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1080/16161262.2014.943996",
language = "English",
volume = "14",
pages = "1--15",
journal = "Journal of Intelligence History",
issn = "1616-1262",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Operation TIGRESS

T2 - deception for counterintelligence and Britain’s 1952 atomic test

AU - Dylan, Huw

PY - 2015/1

Y1 - 2015/1

N2 - Britain tested its first atomic weapon on the Montebello islands, off Western Australia, in October 1952. This test, known as HURRICANE, was supported by an elaborate deception operation, one designed to deceive the Soviets about the date and the true nature of the test. This article examines this deception. It introduces Britain’s post-war deception organisations, the London Controlling Section, later the Directorate of Forward Plans, and how they worked closely with Britain’s atomic scientists from early in the Cold War. Their plans were complicated both by the Soviets’ success in gathering intelligence on Britain’s nuclear programme, and by the West’s difficulty in gathering intelligence on Soviet dispositions. Nevertheless, they utilised a broad range of channels, both open and secret, to implement their scheme. The manner in which they operated suggests that the deception and intelligence machinery had clearly adapted their methods to the Cold War environment, but that the task was considerably more difficult than the one they faced in wartime.

AB - Britain tested its first atomic weapon on the Montebello islands, off Western Australia, in October 1952. This test, known as HURRICANE, was supported by an elaborate deception operation, one designed to deceive the Soviets about the date and the true nature of the test. This article examines this deception. It introduces Britain’s post-war deception organisations, the London Controlling Section, later the Directorate of Forward Plans, and how they worked closely with Britain’s atomic scientists from early in the Cold War. Their plans were complicated both by the Soviets’ success in gathering intelligence on Britain’s nuclear programme, and by the West’s difficulty in gathering intelligence on Soviet dispositions. Nevertheless, they utilised a broad range of channels, both open and secret, to implement their scheme. The manner in which they operated suggests that the deception and intelligence machinery had clearly adapted their methods to the Cold War environment, but that the task was considerably more difficult than the one they faced in wartime.

KW - London Controlling Section

KW - HURRICANE

KW - Deception

KW - Directorate of Forward Plans

U2 - 10.1080/16161262.2014.943996

DO - 10.1080/16161262.2014.943996

M3 - Article

VL - 14

SP - 1

EP - 15

JO - Journal of Intelligence History

JF - Journal of Intelligence History

SN - 1616-1262

IS - 1

ER -

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