Over- and Under-reaction to Transboundary Threats: Two Sides of a Misprinted Coin?

TY - JOUR

T1 - Over- and Under-reaction to Transboundary Threats

T2 - Two Sides of a Misprinted Coin?

AU - Meyer, Christoph

PY - 2016/5/27

Y1 - 2016/5/27

N2 - When states over- and under-react to perceived transboundary threats, their mistakes can have equally harmful consequences for the citizens they mean to protect. Yet, studies of intelligence and conventional foreign policy tend to concentrate on cases of under-reaction to threats from states and few studies set out criteria for identifying cases of under- and over-reaction to other kinds of threats or investigate common causes. The first part of the article develops a typology of over- and under-reaction in foreign policy revolving around threats assessment, response proportionality and timeliness. Drawing on pilot case studies the contribution identifies combinations of factors and conditions that make both over- or under-reaction more likely, rather than those associated with one side of the phenomenon. It is hypothesised that three factors play significant causal roles across the cases: (i) institutions have learned the wrong lessons from previous related incidents, (ii), decision-making is organised within institutional silos focused on only one kind of threat, and, (iii), actors have strong pre-existing preferences for a particular outcome. The contribution concludes that these insights could help practitioners to better monitoring for and take measures against failures in preventive foreign policy.

AB - When states over- and under-react to perceived transboundary threats, their mistakes can have equally harmful consequences for the citizens they mean to protect. Yet, studies of intelligence and conventional foreign policy tend to concentrate on cases of under-reaction to threats from states and few studies set out criteria for identifying cases of under- and over-reaction to other kinds of threats or investigate common causes. The first part of the article develops a typology of over- and under-reaction in foreign policy revolving around threats assessment, response proportionality and timeliness. Drawing on pilot case studies the contribution identifies combinations of factors and conditions that make both over- or under-reaction more likely, rather than those associated with one side of the phenomenon. It is hypothesised that three factors play significant causal roles across the cases: (i) institutions have learned the wrong lessons from previous related incidents, (ii), decision-making is organised within institutional silos focused on only one kind of threat, and, (iii), actors have strong pre-existing preferences for a particular outcome. The contribution concludes that these insights could help practitioners to better monitoring for and take measures against failures in preventive foreign policy.

KW - prevention

KW - warning

KW - intelligence

KW - knowledge

KW - risk

KW - foreign policy

KW - mistakes

U2 - 10.1080/13501763.2015.1127275

DO - 10.1080/13501763.2015.1127275

M3 - Article

SN - 1350-1763

VL - 23

SP - 735

EP - 752

JO - Journal of European Public Policy

JF - Journal of European Public Policy

IS - 5

M1 - 5

ER -