Overpowering. (How the powers ontology has over-reached itself)

TY - JOUR

T1 - Overpowering. (How the powers ontology has over-reached itself)

AU - Bird, Alexander

PY - 2016/4

Y1 - 2016/4

N2 - Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers , and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example, causation, representation, intentionality, free will and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned non-fundamental phenomena. I illustrate this argument by criticizing the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011) and showing that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of) powers.

AB - Many authors have argued in favour of an ontology of properties as powers , and it has been widely argued that this ontology allows us to address certain philosophical problems in novel and illuminating ways, for example, causation, representation, intentionality, free will and liberty. I argue that the ontology of powers, even if successful as an account of fundamental natural properties, does not provide the insight claimed as regards the aforementioned non-fundamental phenomena. I illustrate this argument by criticizing the powers theory of causation presented by Mumford and Anjum (2011) and showing that related criticisms can be directed at other abuses of (the ontology of) powers.

U2 - 10.1093/mind/fzv207

DO - 10.1093/mind/fzv207

M3 - Article

SN - 0026-4423

VL - 125

SP - 341

EP - 883

JO - MIND

JF - MIND

IS - 498

ER -