Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics

Raya Kardasheva

doi:10.1111/ajps.12035

Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics

Raya Kardasheva

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This is an article about package deals in EU legislative politics and their effects on policy outcomes. It analyzes interchamber exchange between the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The main argument is that package deals allow Member States control over the financial aspects of legislation and ensure its timely adoption. In exchange, the Parliament gains access to some of the EU's most expensive policy areas. Intercameral logrolling is analyzed across all EU legislation completed in the period 1 May 1999–30 April 2007, including 2,369 issues, 1,465 legislative proposals, and 19 policy areas. The results indicate that package deals in the EU are conditional on the distributive nature of proposals and their urgency. In turn, through logrolling, the Parliament extends its influence in distributive policies.

Original language	English
Article number	N/A
Pages (from-to)	858-874
Number of pages	17
Journal	AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume	57
Issue number	4
Early online date	2 May 2013
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12035
Publication status	Published - Oct 2013

Keywords

EU
legislative politics
package deals

Access to Document

10.1111/ajps.12035

29 Citations
1 Article

Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics
Kardasheva, R., Oct 2013, In: AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 57, 4, p. 858-874 17 p., N/A.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
29 Citations (Scopus)

Cite this

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Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics

Abstract

Keywords

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Package Deals in EU Legislative Politics

Cite this