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Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm

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Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm. / Stazicker, James.

In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, Vol. 373, No. 1755, 20170350, 19.09.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Stazicker, J 2018, 'Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm', Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, vol. 373, no. 1755, 20170350. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0350

APA

Stazicker, J. (2018). Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences, 373(1755), [20170350]. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0350

Vancouver

Stazicker J. Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences. 2018 Sep 19;373(1755). 20170350. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0350

Author

Stazicker, James. / Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm. In: Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences. 2018 ; Vol. 373, No. 1755.

Bibtex Download

@article{759c3db386f24a2ca71151e6b85fc339,
title = "Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm",
abstract = "Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as {\textquoteleft}cognitive access{\textquoteright}? The dominant methodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject's partial report is evidence that she is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. So, partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only if there were uncontroversial evidence for consciousness that did not imply reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead, it focuses on a function of perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject's behaviour.",
author = "James Stazicker",
year = "2018",
month = sep,
day = "19",
doi = "10.1098/rstb.2017.0350",
language = "English",
volume = "373",
journal = "Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences",
issn = "0962-8436",
publisher = "Royal Society of London",
number = "1755",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Partial Report is the Wrong Paradigm

AU - Stazicker, James

PY - 2018/9/19

Y1 - 2018/9/19

N2 - Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as ‘cognitive access’? The dominant methodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject's partial report is evidence that she is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. So, partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only if there were uncontroversial evidence for consciousness that did not imply reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead, it focuses on a function of perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject's behaviour.

AB - Is consciousness independent of the general-purpose information processes known as ‘cognitive access’? The dominant methodology for supporting this independence hypothesis appeals to partial report experiments as evidence for perceptual consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Using a standard model of evidential support, and reviewing recent elaborations of the partial report paradigm, this article argues that the paradigm has the wrong structure to support the independence hypothesis. Like reports in general, a subject's partial report is evidence that she is conscious of information only where that information is cognitively accessed. So, partial report experiments could dissociate consciousness from cognitive access only if there were uncontroversial evidence for consciousness that did not imply reportability. There is no such evidence. An alternative, broadly Marrian methodology for supporting the independence hypothesis is suggested, and some challenges to it outlined. This methodology does not require experimental evidence for consciousness in the absence of cognitive access. Instead, it focuses on a function of perceptual consciousness when a stimulus is cognitively accessed. If the processes best suited to implement this function exclude cognitive access, the independence hypothesis will be supported. One relevant function of consciousness may be reflected in reason-based psychological explanations of a subject's behaviour.

U2 - 10.1098/rstb.2017.0350

DO - 10.1098/rstb.2017.0350

M3 - Article

VL - 373

JO - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences

JF - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B: Biological Sciences

SN - 0962-8436

IS - 1755

M1 - 20170350

ER -

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