Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived

AU - Brewer, Mark William

PY - 2020/10/16

Y1 - 2020/10/16

N2 - We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its source in perception alone. Evans offers a proposal about how to understand the way in which its objects’ existence unperceived may indeed be an aspect of our perception that has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objectivity. I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that Evans’s proposal may be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of formal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any experience.

AB - We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its source in perception alone. Evans offers a proposal about how to understand the way in which its objects’ existence unperceived may indeed be an aspect of our perception that has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objectivity. I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that Evans’s proposal may be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of formal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any experience.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85090935563&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/phis.12169

DO - 10.1111/phis.12169

M3 - Article

SN - 1758-2237

VL - 30

SP - 24

EP - 38

JO - Philosophical Issues

JF - Philosophical Issues

IS - 1

ER -