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Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived

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Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived. / Brewer, Mark William.

In: Philosophical Issues, 31.01.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Brewer, MW 2020, 'Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived', Philosophical Issues.

APA

Brewer, M. W. (2020). Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Vancouver

Brewer MW. Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived. Philosophical Issues. 2020 Jan 31.

Author

Brewer, Mark William. / Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived. In: Philosophical Issues. 2020.

Bibtex Download

@article{314ed5a00a1a47279cd7926f524fab1a,
title = "Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived",
abstract = "We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its source in perception alone. Evans offers a proposal about how to understand the way in which its objects’ existence unperceived may indeed be an aspect of our perception that has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objectivity. I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that Evans’s proposal may be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of formal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any experience.",
author = "Brewer, {Mark William}",
year = "2020",
month = "1",
day = "31",
language = "English",
journal = "Philosophical Issues",
issn = "1758-2237",
publisher = "Wiley-VCH Verlag",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perception of Continued Existence Unperceived

AU - Brewer, Mark William

PY - 2020/1/31

Y1 - 2020/1/31

N2 - We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its source in perception alone. Evans offers a proposal about how to understand the way in which its objects’ existence unperceived may indeed be an aspect of our perception that has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objectivity. I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that Evans’s proposal may be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of formal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any experience.

AB - We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. Yet Hume argues that the belief in continued existence unperceived cannot have its source in perception alone. Evans offers a proposal about how to understand the way in which its objects’ existence unperceived may indeed be an aspect of our perception that has in one way or another been involved in most of the developed accounts of perceptual objectivity. I elaborate these ideas and arguments before considering various ways that Evans’s proposal may be implemented. I argue that those currently on offer face serious objections before sketching my own alternative implementation and giving some indication of its virtues. Its key is to allow, in addition to the perceptual evidence grounded in the objects and properties that a person is acquainted with in any particular perceptual experience, also for a kind of formal perceptual evidence grounded in the way in which she is acquainted with such things in any experience.

M3 - Article

JO - Philosophical Issues

JF - Philosophical Issues

SN - 1758-2237

ER -

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