Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception

Mark Textor

doi:10.1007/s11097-018-9570-2

Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception

Mark Textor^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

296 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience mind-independence by mainly drawing on the work of the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker who, in turn, built on Husserl’s work. In the development of this claim the notion of a limit – either a maximum or minimum – of perception will play an important role.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-14
Number of pages	14
Journal	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Early online date	12 Apr 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9570-2
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 12 Apr 2018

Keywords

Conrad Martius
Duncker
Husserl
Object constancy
Perceptual constancy

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Perceptual objectivity and the_TEXTOR_Accepted12April2018_GOLD VoR (CC BY)Final published version, 431 KBLicence: CC BY

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Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception

Abstract

Keywords

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