Picking a CHERI Allocator: Security and Performance Considerations

Jacob Bramley, Dejice Jacob, Andrei Lascu, Jeremy Singer, Laurence Tratt

Research output: Contribution to journalConference paperpeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Several open-source memory allocators have been ported to CHERI, a hardware capability platform. In this paper we examine the security and performance of these allocators when run under CheriBSD on Arm's prototype Morello platform. We introduce a number of security attacks and show that all but one allocator are vulnerable to some of the attacks - - including the default CheriBSD allocator. We then show that while some forms of allocator performance are meaningful, comparing the performance of hybrid and pure capability (i.e. "running in non-CHERI vs. running in CHERI modes") allocators does not currently appear to be meaningful. Although we do not fully understand the reasons for this, it seems to be at least as much due to factors such as immature compiler toolchains and prototype hardware as it is due to the effects of capabilities on performance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)111-123
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Symposium on Memory Management, ISMM
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 6 Jun 2023
Event2023 ACM SIGPLAN International Symposium on Memory Management, ISMM 2023 - Orlando, United States
Duration: 18 Jun 202318 Jun 2023

Keywords

  • capabilities
  • CHERI
  • memory allocators
  • software implementation
  • validation

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Picking a CHERI Allocator: Security and Performance Considerations'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this