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Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making

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Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making. / Koop, Christel; Hanretty, Chris.

In: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 51, No. 1, 01.01.2018, p. 38-75.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Koop, C & Hanretty, C 2018, 'Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making', COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 38-75. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017695329

APA

Koop, C., & Hanretty, C. (2018). Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 51(1), 38-75. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017695329

Vancouver

Koop C, Hanretty C. Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES. 2018 Jan 1;51(1):38-75. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017695329

Author

Koop, Christel ; Hanretty, Chris. / Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making. In: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES. 2018 ; Vol. 51, No. 1. pp. 38-75.

Bibtex Download

@article{95a8f84afefa4879a823bb0f19862db8,
title = "Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making",
abstract = "Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 OECD countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system.",
keywords = "Delegation , Independence, Accountability, Regulation, Performance",
author = "Christel Koop and Chris Hanretty",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1177/0010414017695329",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "38--75",
journal = "COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES",
issn = "0010-4140",
publisher = "Sage",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making

AU - Koop, Christel

AU - Hanretty, Chris

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 OECD countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system.

AB - Recent decades have seen a considerable increase in delegation to independent regulatory agencies, which has been justified by reference to the superior performance of these bodies relative to government departments. Yet, the hypothesis that more independent regulators do better work has hardly been tested. We examine the link using a comprehensive measure of the quality of work carried out by competition authorities in 30 OECD countries, and new data on the design of these organizations. We find that formal independence has a positive and significant effect on quality. Contrary to expectations, though, formal political accountability does not boost regulatory quality, and there is no evidence that it increases the effect of independence by reducing the risk of slacking. The quality of work is also enhanced by increased staffing, more extensive regulatory powers, and spillover effects of a more capable bureaucratic system.

KW - Delegation

KW - Independence

KW - Accountability

KW - Regulation

KW - Performance

U2 - 10.1177/0010414017695329

DO - 10.1177/0010414017695329

M3 - Article

VL - 51

SP - 38

EP - 75

JO - COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES

JF - COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES

SN - 0010-4140

IS - 1

ER -

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