Politics of trade protection in an autocracy: Evidence from an EU tariff liberalization in Morocco

TY - JOUR

T1 - Politics of trade protection in an autocracy

T2 - Evidence from an EU tariff liberalization in Morocco

AU - Eibl, Ferdinand

AU - Malik, Adeel

AU - Ruckteschler, Christian

N1 - Funding Information: This research was completed with financial support from an award by the Economic and Social Research Council (Award Number ES/J500112/1). Malik and Eibl gratefully acknowledge a small grant from the Cairo-based Economic Research Forum, Egypt. We are grateful to Anthony Venables, Beata Javorcik, and Ishac Diwan for their constructive comments on the paper. We also received useful feedback from seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Oxford, University of Nottingham, American University of Cairo, and the World Bank. Funding Information: This research was completed with financial support from an award by the Economic and Social Research Council (Award Number ES/J500112/1 ). Malik and Eibl gratefully acknowledge a small grant from the Cairo-based Economic Research Forum, Egypt . We are grateful to Anthony Venables, Beata Javorcik, and Ishac Diwan for their constructive comments on the paper. We also received useful feedback from seminar participants at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of Oxford, University of Nottingham, American University of Cairo, and the World Bank. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Elsevier B.V. Copyright: Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Although non-tariff measures (NTMs) have surpassed tariffs as the most prevalent instrument of trade protection globally, our knowledge of what drives these NTMs is extremely limited. This paper sheds light on the political determinants of non-tariff protection using a rich empirical setting in Morocco. Taking advantage of a bilateral EU-Morocco trade agreement that resulted in an across-the-board tariff cut and a subsequent rise in NTMs, we use a difference-in-differences regression framework to show that sectors with close prior political connections to the royal family received disproportionately higher levels of non-tariff protection after the EU Agreement than unconnected sectors. We also demonstrate that, in the wake of the EU-induced tariff cut, connected sectors were mainly compensated through technical barriers to trade that depend on administrative oversight and are vulnerable to political influence.

AB - Although non-tariff measures (NTMs) have surpassed tariffs as the most prevalent instrument of trade protection globally, our knowledge of what drives these NTMs is extremely limited. This paper sheds light on the political determinants of non-tariff protection using a rich empirical setting in Morocco. Taking advantage of a bilateral EU-Morocco trade agreement that resulted in an across-the-board tariff cut and a subsequent rise in NTMs, we use a difference-in-differences regression framework to show that sectors with close prior political connections to the royal family received disproportionately higher levels of non-tariff protection after the EU Agreement than unconnected sectors. We also demonstrate that, in the wake of the EU-induced tariff cut, connected sectors were mainly compensated through technical barriers to trade that depend on administrative oversight and are vulnerable to political influence.

KW - Trade liberalisation

KW - Crony capitalism

KW - Morocco

KW - Middle East and North Africa

KW - Authoritarianism

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85108543118&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102063

DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102063

M3 - Article

SN - 0176-2680

JO - European Journal of Political Economy

JF - European Journal of Political Economy

M1 - 102063

ER -