Promises and Conflicting Obligations

David Owens

doi:10.26556/jesp.v11i1.106

Promises and Conflicting Obligations

David Owens

Philosophy

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Abstract

This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make binding promises that conflict with our prior obligations. There is also consideration of the parallel case of ‘wicked commands’.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Volume	XI
Issue number	I
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v11i1.106
Publication status	Published - 1 Nov 2016

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10.26556/jesp.v11i1.106

Promises and Conflicting Obligations_OWENS_Accepted 1Oct2016_GREEN AAMAccepted author manuscript, 229 KB

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2846697

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called {\textquoteleft}wicked promises{\textquoteright}? The answer to both questions is {\textquoteleft}yes{\textquoteright}. The discussion examines both {\textquoteleft}natural right{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}social practice{\textquoteright} approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make binding promises that conflict with our prior obligations. There is also consideration of the parallel case of {\textquoteleft}wicked commands{\textquoteright}.",

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Promises and Conflicting Obligations

Abstract

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