Research output: Working paper

**Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games.** / Anbarci, Nejat; Cingiz, Kutay; Ismail, Mehmet.

Research output: Working paper

Anbarci, N, Cingiz, K & Ismail, M 2020 'Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games'.

Anbarci, N., Cingiz, K., & Ismail, M. (2020). *Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games*.

Anbarci N, Cingiz K, Ismail M. Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games. 2020 Oct 10.

@techreport{8bde0a23fad44ed2bfc0f0192ec2b779,

title = "Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games",

abstract = "We introduce a novel and general model of dynamic $n$-player Blotto contests. The players have asymmetric resources, the battlefields are heterogenous, and contest success functions are general as well. We obtain one possibility and one impossibility result. When players maximize the expected value of the battles, the strategy profile in which players allocate their resources proportional to the sizes of the battles at every history---whether their resources are fixed from the beginning or can be subject to shocks in time---is a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, when players maximize the probability of winning, there is always a distribution of values over the battles such that proportional resource allocation cannot be supported as an equilibrium.",

author = "Nejat Anbarci and Kutay Cingiz and Mehmet Ismail",

year = "2020",

month = oct,

day = "10",

language = "English",

type = "WorkingPaper",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games

AU - Anbarci, Nejat

AU - Cingiz, Kutay

AU - Ismail, Mehmet

PY - 2020/10/10

Y1 - 2020/10/10

N2 - We introduce a novel and general model of dynamic $n$-player Blotto contests. The players have asymmetric resources, the battlefields are heterogenous, and contest success functions are general as well. We obtain one possibility and one impossibility result. When players maximize the expected value of the battles, the strategy profile in which players allocate their resources proportional to the sizes of the battles at every history---whether their resources are fixed from the beginning or can be subject to shocks in time---is a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, when players maximize the probability of winning, there is always a distribution of values over the battles such that proportional resource allocation cannot be supported as an equilibrium.

AB - We introduce a novel and general model of dynamic $n$-player Blotto contests. The players have asymmetric resources, the battlefields are heterogenous, and contest success functions are general as well. We obtain one possibility and one impossibility result. When players maximize the expected value of the battles, the strategy profile in which players allocate their resources proportional to the sizes of the battles at every history---whether their resources are fixed from the beginning or can be subject to shocks in time---is a subgame perfect equilibrium. However, when players maximize the probability of winning, there is always a distribution of values over the battles such that proportional resource allocation cannot be supported as an equilibrium.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Proportional resource allocation in dynamic n-player Blotto games

ER -

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