Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks

Matteo Cavaliere; Sean Sedwards; Corina E. Tarnita; Martin A. Nowak; Attila Csikasz-Nagy

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005

Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks

Matteo Cavaliere, Sean Sedwards, Corina E. Tarnita, Martin A. Nowak, Attila Csikasz-Nagy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

53 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and reformation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between 'cooperators' and 'defectors'. We employ a game-theoretic model of dynamic network formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the highly connected networks they invade. Once the network is fragmented it can be reconstructed by a new invasion of cooperators, leading to the cycle of formation and fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	126-138
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume	299
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005
Publication status	Published - 21 Apr 2012

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10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005

Cite this

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title = "Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks",

abstract = "Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and reformation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between 'cooperators' and 'defectors'. We employ a game-theoretic model of dynamic network formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the highly connected networks they invade. Once the network is fragmented it can be reconstructed by a new invasion of cooperators, leading to the cycle of formation and fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation.",

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AU - Cavaliere, Matteo

AU - Sedwards, Sean

AU - Tarnita, Corina E.

AU - Nowak, Martin A.

AU - Csikasz-Nagy, Attila

PY - 2012/4/21

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AB - Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and reformation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between 'cooperators' and 'defectors'. We employ a game-theoretic model of dynamic network formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the highly connected networks they invade. Once the network is fragmented it can be reconstructed by a new invasion of cooperators, leading to the cycle of formation and fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation.

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