Abstract
Orthodox just war theorists argue that the principles governing conduct in war—jus in bello—broadly track the current laws of armed conflict. Revisionists deny this. This chapter argues that these first-order disagreements are traceable to second-order disputes about (i) the appropriate site of principles of jus in bello and (ii) the feasibility constraints that theorizing about jus in bello should take into account. Regarding (i), orthodox theorists focus on the institutions that govern armed conflict, revisionists on individuals’ conduct. The chapter shows that, holding a given site constant, the substantive disagreement between the camps shrinks. Regarding (ii), orthodox theorists factor likely non-compliance into the design of the jus in bello, revisionists resist this move. It is argued that, relative to the site for which each is theorizing, both stances are defensible. Attention to second-order disputes in the ethics of war helps us better diagnose and adjudicate first-order ones.
Keywords: just war theory, noncombatant immunity, site of justice, jus in bello, ethics of war
Keywords: just war theory, noncombatant immunity, site of justice, jus in bello, ethics of war
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy |
| Editors | David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, Steven Wall |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 7 |
| Pages | 166-196 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Volume | 3 |
| Edition | 1 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191840272 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198801221, 9780198801238 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 6 Jul 2016 |
Publication series
| Name | Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Volume | 3 |