Abstract
This paper explores the role of morale in the military strategic process and demonstrates, for the first time, how it is possible to construct a methodologically sound quantitative approach for assessing morale in an historical battle context (the British Army’s progress through Northwest Europe in 1944/5). It proposes a functional conceptualisation of morale, which focuses its meaning and relevance on motivation and the willingness to act in a manner required by an authority or institution. These approaches, at least when applied to the Northwest Europe campaign, point to the need to reevaluate the dominant theories on combat cohesion. It is concluded that strategy, understood as an iterative multilevel process rather than a level of war or activity situated only as a bridge between national policy and tactics, lies at the heart of any understanding of combat cohesion.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Frontline |
| Subtitle of host publication | Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century |
| Editors | Anthony King |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 134-166 |
| Number of pages | 33 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198719663 |
| Publication status | Published - 30 Jul 2015 |
Keywords
- Cohesion
- Combat Performance
- Morale
- Primary Group
- Strategy