Abstract
Independence is nowadays a key characteristic of many agencies involved in regulatory governance, and has broadly diffused across both countries and sectors. In this chapter, we discuss to what extent political independence – especially from the executive – affects the quality of regulation that agencies deliver. To this purpose, we examine the existing literature across different regulatory fields. We find support for the connection, though it is often conditional on other variables such as the configuration of veto players in a country. Yet, whilst most research on the effect of agency independence is related to utilities and financial sectors, only few studies have focused on social and risk regulation, where institutional configurations tend to differ significantly. We conclude by calling for a two-pronged agenda, including a deepening of the research – with more elaborate models and better strategies to cope with endogeneity – and a broadening of the research question – in terms of conceptions of independence and regulatory quality.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Handbook of Regulatory Authorities |
| Editors | Martino Maggetti, Fabrizio Di Mascio, Alessandro Natalini |
| Publisher | Edward Elgar |
| Chapter | 14 |
| Pages | 211-226 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781839108983 |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |