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Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale. / Skarbek, Emily.

In: Journal of Private Enterprise, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2008.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Skarbek, E 2008, 'Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale', Journal of Private Enterprise, vol. 24, no. 1.

APA

Skarbek, E. (2008). Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale. Journal of Private Enterprise, 24(1).

Vancouver

Skarbek E. Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale. Journal of Private Enterprise. 2008;24(1).

Author

Skarbek, Emily. / Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale. In: Journal of Private Enterprise. 2008 ; Vol. 24, No. 1.

Bibtex Download

@article{9345476285f34fcdadf132ac89a2ada9,
title = "Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale",
abstract = "Migrant worker remittances often take place outside the scope of government enforcement. Through an examination of the informal remittance transfer system of hawala, this paper argues that self-enforcing exchange mechanisms can support high volume trade in the absence of formal contract enforcement. Hawala networks employ ex post reputation mechanisms between agents and ex ante signaling to uphold obligations under conditions of contract uncertainty.",
author = "Emily Skarbek",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
journal = "Journal of Private Enterprise",
issn = "0890-913X",
publisher = "Association of Private Enterprise Education",
number = "1",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Remittances and Reputations in Hawala Money-Transfer Systems: Self-Enforcing Exchange on an International Scale

AU - Skarbek, Emily

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Migrant worker remittances often take place outside the scope of government enforcement. Through an examination of the informal remittance transfer system of hawala, this paper argues that self-enforcing exchange mechanisms can support high volume trade in the absence of formal contract enforcement. Hawala networks employ ex post reputation mechanisms between agents and ex ante signaling to uphold obligations under conditions of contract uncertainty.

AB - Migrant worker remittances often take place outside the scope of government enforcement. Through an examination of the informal remittance transfer system of hawala, this paper argues that self-enforcing exchange mechanisms can support high volume trade in the absence of formal contract enforcement. Hawala networks employ ex post reputation mechanisms between agents and ex ante signaling to uphold obligations under conditions of contract uncertainty.

M3 - Article

VL - 24

JO - Journal of Private Enterprise

T2 - Journal of Private Enterprise

JF - Journal of Private Enterprise

SN - 0890-913X

IS - 1

ER -

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