Remuneration of non-executive directors: Evidence from the UK

TY - JOUR

T1 - Remuneration of non-executive directors

T2 - Evidence from the UK

AU - Goh, Lisa

AU - Gupta, Aditi

PY - 2016/9/1

Y1 - 2016/9/1

N2 - This study examines the remuneration of non-executive directors, examining individual monitoring characteristics and director capital in addition to firm characteristics. Using a large sample of FTSE All-Share non-executive directors from 2001 to 2012, we find that remuneration is positively linked to both directors' individual characteristics and firm characteristics. We find that director age, tenure, and network size are positively related to remuneration, suggesting that directors' ability to contribute to board decision-making and their set of resources are valued by firms. We find that director remuneration is negatively related to monitoring characteristics such as director independence, suggesting possible agency considerations, as effective monitors of top management are paid less. However, director ownership has a non-linear relationship with remuneration, and is substitutive at higher levels of ownership. We also observe that UK boards are relatively homogeneous, with few female directors and even fewer Chairmen, and find strong evidence of a gender gap in remuneration when examining inter- and intra-firm variations. Our findings have implications for regulators who seek to intervene in board appointments, as they indicate that firms do not necessarily value or reward resources brought by female or independent directors.

AB - This study examines the remuneration of non-executive directors, examining individual monitoring characteristics and director capital in addition to firm characteristics. Using a large sample of FTSE All-Share non-executive directors from 2001 to 2012, we find that remuneration is positively linked to both directors' individual characteristics and firm characteristics. We find that director age, tenure, and network size are positively related to remuneration, suggesting that directors' ability to contribute to board decision-making and their set of resources are valued by firms. We find that director remuneration is negatively related to monitoring characteristics such as director independence, suggesting possible agency considerations, as effective monitors of top management are paid less. However, director ownership has a non-linear relationship with remuneration, and is substitutive at higher levels of ownership. We also observe that UK boards are relatively homogeneous, with few female directors and even fewer Chairmen, and find strong evidence of a gender gap in remuneration when examining inter- and intra-firm variations. Our findings have implications for regulators who seek to intervene in board appointments, as they indicate that firms do not necessarily value or reward resources brought by female or independent directors.

U2 - 10.1016/j.bar.2015.05.001

DO - 10.1016/j.bar.2015.05.001

M3 - Article

SN - 0890-8389

VL - 48

SP - 379

EP - 399

JO - British Accounting Review

JF - British Accounting Review

IS - 3

ER -