Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms

Laura Valentini

doi:10.1111/nous.12319

Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms

Laura Valentini

Political Economy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Abstract When and why do socially constructed norms?including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs?generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call ?agency respect.? This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people's commitments as agents and (ii) they do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for.

Original language	English
Journal	NOUS
Volume	n/a
Issue number	n/a
Early online date	12 Dec 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12319
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 12 Dec 2019

Keywords

commitments
norms
respect
authority of law
harmless wrongdoing

Access to Document

10.1111/nous.12319

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102012/

Cite this

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abstract = "Abstract When and why do socially constructed norms?including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs?generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call ?agency respect.? This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people's commitments as agents and (ii) they do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for.",

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N2 - Abstract When and why do socially constructed norms?including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs?generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call ?agency respect.? This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people's commitments as agents and (ii) they do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for.

AB - Abstract When and why do socially constructed norms?including the laws of the land, norms of etiquette, and informal customs?generate moral obligations? I argue that the answer lies in the duty to respect others, specifically to give them what I call ?agency respect.? This is the kind of respect that people are owed in light of how they exercise their agency. My central thesis is this: To the extent that (i) existing norms are underpinned by people's commitments as agents and (ii) they do not conflict with morality, they place moral demands on us on agency-respect grounds. This view of the moral force of socially constructed norms, I suggest, is superior to views that deny the moral force of such norms, and it elegantly explains certain instances of wrongdoing that would otherwise remain unaccounted for.

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KW - norms

KW - respect

KW - authority of law

KW - harmless wrongdoing

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Respect for persons and the moral force of socially constructed norms

Abstract

Keywords

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