Rules and Rulers: Demanding, Commanding and Assuming Responsibility

David Owens

doi:10.16995/pp.15381

Rules and Rulers: Demanding, Commanding and Assuming Responsibility

David Owens

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Directive authorities such as police officers, judges and employers demand our obedience. Demands for obedience come in two forms. First authorities issue commands meant to bind us to obey. Second authorities frequently threaten to enforce their commands by coercion, to extract obedience by force. Liberals, anarchists and others have long regarded command and coercion as being especially problematic ways of getting someone to act, as raising a question about the legitimacy of such directive authorities but it remains unclear why being ordered about is any worse than being subject to social rules, rules that require us to behave in various ways. I argue that someone who demands your obedience seeks to assume responsibility for your compliance. That is why the claims of a ruler threaten our liberty as those of binding social rules do not.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	463-487
Number of pages	25
Journal	Political Philosophy
Volume	1
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.16995/pp.15381
Publication status	Published - 30 Sept 2024

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Rules and Rulers: Demanding, Commanding and Assuming Responsibility

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